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Abstract 
The final destination of monetary policy and integration for the Central and Eastern 
European EU accession countries is the joining of the euro area. The European Union 
has affirmed that, according to the EC Treaty, this will be possible, at the earliest, two 
years after EU accession. Against this background, the most important issue for the 
accession countries to decide is whether to aim for an early introduction of the euro a 
few years after EU accession or to opt for a more gradual strategy of monetary 
integration. This paper reviews the main arguments for and against either of these 
approaches. Thus, the focus is on the question of how speedily to introduce the euro in 
the accession countries, within the standard path laid down in the EU accession 
negotiations. 
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Alternative Options for the Monetary Integration of Central and 
Eastern European EU Accession Countries 
Peter Backé and Cezary Wójcik 
Introduction 
Monetary integration in the European Union (EU) has advanced very far, based 
on the Maastricht Treaty, which outlined a staged approach towards the creation of an 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Within this framework, eleven EU Member 
States formed a monetary union in 1999 and the euro was introduced as the single 
currency in this newly formed monetary area. In the meantime, the euro area has been 
enlarged to twelve countries and, furthermore, the three remaining EU Member States, 
which have not yet adopted the single currency, have increasingly been attracted to the 
euro area, in particular by the successful introduction of euro coins and banknotes at the 
beginning of 2002.  
Against this backdrop, the final destination of monetary policy and integration 
for the Central and Eastern European EU accession countries is obvious: at some point 
in the future, eight or even more accession countries are set to join the euro area. The 
European Union has outlined a three-step approach to the monetary integration of 
accession countries. The applicants will first join the EU, then enter the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism II (ERM II) of the European Union. Finally, after fulfillment of the 
Maastricht convergence criteria, they will accede to the euro area, i.e. participate fully 
in the Economic and Monetary Union. This means that the euro is to be introduced in 
today's accession countries in a consensual manner, based on the standard convergence 
examination procedure and not sooner than at least two years after the EU accession. 
The latter aspect results, in particular, from the convergence criteria that include, as a 
legal requirement for the adoption of the euro, a two-year participation in the ERM II, 
without a devaluation of the parity rate against the euro during this period (see Ecofin, 
2000). ERM II, in turn, is solely open to EU member states and participation in this 
mechanism can thus begin only after accession to the European Union.  
The EU has made it clear that an introduction of the euro as a legal tender in an 
accession country without the consent of the European Union is not an appropriate way 
to move ahead towards full monetary integration with the euro area. The main argument 
is that such a unilateral euroization "would run counter to the underlying economic 
reasoning of EMU in the [EC] Treaty, which foresees the eventual adoption of the euro 
as the endpoint of a structured convergence process within a multilateral framework" 
(Ecofin, 2000). In taking this stance, the European Union reacted to a discussion that 
got momentum in 1999 and early 2000 whether a fast, if not instant, introduction of the 
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euro in the accession countries would economically be more advantageous, in particular 
for the candidates, than the monetary integration path outlined by the European Union 1.   
Given the position of the EU, it is evident that such a rapid or even immediate 
adoption of the euro, if it were to occur, could only be done unilaterally by the accession 
country, which would – hypothetically – opt for such an approach. Backé and Wójcik 
(2002) argue that the institutional considerations that are usually invoked to validate the 
European Union's objection to unilateral euroization by accession countries are 
supported by economic considerations. Unilateral euroization would bring fewer 
benefits than joining the euro area on the standard pathway: no seigniorage revenues 
and no lender of last resort function under the former option. At the same time, the 
adoption of a foreign currency as legal tender, while eliminating the risk of exchange 
rate crises, does not do away with the balance of payments constraint. In addition, if 
nominal convergence is not far advanced at the point in time of the introduction of the 
foreign currency, major swings in real activity may ensue, with negative knock-on 
effects on financial stability and catching-up perspectives.  
Another point the EU has underlined is that the Maastricht convergence criteria 
will not be changed for the accession countries and that these criteria will be applied in 
the same manner as in the convergence examinations so far. This is to "ensure equal 
treatment between future Member States and the current participants in the euro area" 
(Ecofin, 2000). Again, the European Union's emphasis on this point has been a response 
to a debate of whether the Maastricht criteria should be adapted for accession countries, 
mainly to take into account that these countries have embarked on a catching-up path 
towards average EU income-per-capita levels 2. 
The accession countries have essentially accepted the EU position in the course 
of the accession negotiations, and the negotiation of the chapter on Economic and 
Monetary Union has been concluded with all accession countries (but Romania, in the 
case of which  it has not been opened yet). Discussions about rapid unilateral 
euroization or an adaptation of the Maastricht criteria have not impinged upon the basic 
policy line to stick, in principle, to the three-stage approach proposed by the European 
Union. The awareness about the risks and costs of a rapid and unilateral introduction of 
the euro has increased in the accession countries. There is a growing perception in the 
candidate countries that the predominantly nominal Maastricht convergence criteria 
form an acceptable set of criteria to qualify for monetary union, in particular if 
compared with other potential sets of benchmarks, which could also include real 
convergence requirements.  
This being so, the most important issue for the accession countries to decide is 
whether to aim for an early introduction of the euro two or three years after EU 
accession or to opt for a more gradual strategy of monetary integration. This paper 
reviews the arguments for and against either of these approaches. Thus, the focus is on 
the question of how speedily to introduce the euro in the accession countries, within the 
standard path laid down in the EU accession negotiations.  
                                                
1
 For a review of this discussion see Backé and Wójcik (2002). 
2
 For the main features of this debate see the discussion part in Backé (2002).  
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This issue of what is the appropriate pace of monetary integration is being 
intensely discussed in the accession countries. Several countries, notably Hungary, 
Slovenia and Estonia, are aiming at joining the euro area as soon as possible after the 
EU accession. In the other countries, the decision-making process is still evolving. 
Within this group, the central banks of Poland, Slovakia and Latvia are more or less 
clearly leaning towards going for a swift participation in the euro area after having 
joined the European Union, but an official policy statement on the issue (accorded 
between the government and the central bank) has not been reached yet 3.  
What are the issues that arise when assessing the merits and disadvantages of a 
(relatively) fast monetary integration versus a more gradual approach? Joining a 
monetary union holds considerable potential benefits, but also substantial potential risks 
if undertaken prematurely. However, there are severe limitations to making an 
economic cost-benefit analysis of a country's participation in a monetary union and, 
even more so, in using cost-benefit analysis for determining the optimal speed towards 
full monetary integration. This is so mainly for two reasons. First and generally, there is 
no uniformly accepted basis among economists for assessing the costs and benefits of 
joining a monetary union. Second and more specifically, in the case of the accession 
countries, there is no satisfactory model to estimate all relevant effects jointly within a 
unified framework. In this latter respect, the situation in the accession countries differs 
from the state that prevailed in the incumbent EU member states when they did their 
cost-benefit assessments in the run-up to the creation of the euro area 4.  
Against this backdrop, a pragmatic approach is to focus on the presumably most 
important effects only and to assess these factors individually. In doing so, the key 
factors, which have to be discussed are the costs and benefits of giving up the monetary 
and exchange rate instruments; trade and growth gains; and credibility effects. Other 
aspects, like, for example, the role of monetary integration as a potential catalyst to 
fiscal consolidation and to structural reforms, are also relevant but appear, in overall 
terms, to be less central and are therefore not discussed further 5. In the analysis, a 
dynamic perspective has to be taken which considers how the effects change over time. 
This is particularly important if the costs of full monetary integration tend to decrease 
over time, as structural convergence proceeds. Based on this line of reasoning, what has 
to be assessed is at what point in time the costs and risks of full monetary integration are 
sufficiently contained so that they are outweighed by the benefits of participation in the 
euro area. Obviously, the downside of this approach is that it essentially neglects 
possible linkages among the single effects and that it takes a very simplistic line on the 
aggregation of individual factors. Still, these shortcomings have to be accepted, as there 
is apparently no other feasible approach at this stage.  
                                                
3
 For a selective review of the monetary policy integration strategies of the accession countries 
see Moser, Pointner and Backé (2002).  
4
 For two of these country studies on the costs and benefits of euro area accession, pertaining to 
Austria and Sweden respectively, see Baumgartner et al. (1997) and Calmfors et al. (1997).  
5
 For a review of these further effects see Backé and Wójcik (2002). 
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The Cost Side
 
The diversity of views among economists about the potential effects of joining a 
monetary union is particularly pronounced for the cost side. The standard approach to 
assess the costs of the adoption of a foreign currency as a legal tender is, or has until 
recently been, the optimum currency area theory (OCA theory).  
The OCA theory considers a common currency optimal for countries which are 
exposed to mainly symmetric shocks or which have mechanisms in place for the 
adjustment to asymmetric shocks. The latter include, according to the theory, wage and 
price flexibility, factor mobility and/or fiscal transfers. The smaller the exposure to 
asymmetric shocks, the less is there the need to resort to such adjustment mechanisms. 
In order to lower the probability of asymmetric shocks, it is crucial that the trade of 
participating countries is highly integrated and that their exports are well diversified in 
terms of the structure of exported goods and services, which in turn will contribute to 
fostering business cycle synchronization 6.  
However, the OCA theory that was long "the organizing framework" 
(Eichengreen, 1997) for the analysis of monetary unification has recently met with 
increasing criticism within the economists' profession, mostly on three grounds. The 
first argument is that the OCA criteria are endogenous. Frankel and Rose (1998) 
maintain that joining a currency union (or a credible fixing of the exchange rate) will 
eliminate exchange rate uncertainty and reduce currency transaction costs, which will 
stimulate bilateral trade and hence deepen the economic integration between trade 
partners. This will foster business cycle synchronization and reduce the exposure to 
asymmetric real shocks that in turn will validate (ex post) the adoption of the common 
currency.  
Second, risk-sharing arguments suggest that, under full financial market 
integration, countries, which are exposed to asymmetric shocks, may profit from 
monetary unification. The idea is that using a common currency will facilitate portfolio 
diversification, which allows countries to adjust more smoothly and at lower costs to 
asymmetric real shocks, due to mutual claims on each other's resources. This view was 
first put forward by Mundell (1973) and has increasingly been echoed in the recent 
debate on the OCA theory (see McKinnon 2001, Buiter, 2002).  
A third proposition is that the exchange rate tends to be a source of shocks 
rather than a shock absorber, in particular for small open economies. Thus, even if 
there were a potential for asymmetric real shocks to occur, the exchange rate would 
either be ineffective as an adjustment tool and/or any beneficial effects from retaining it 
may be more than offset by the costs caused by nominal exchange rate volatility and, in 
the worst instance, exchange rate crises (see e.g. Buiter, 2000). This stance, which can 
be traced back to Friedman (1968), challenges the view that structural considerations 
are important for the choice of exchange rate regime – a view that at least implicitly 
assumes that monetary and exchange rate policy is an effective tool of economic policy. 
This criticism of the OCA theory also features in the "fear of floating" literature (see 
                                                
6
 For a detailed review of the OCA theory see Horvath (2001a).  
 
 5
Hausmann et al., 1999, Calvo and Reinhart, 2000) which essentially argues that 
emerging market economies cannot effectively utilize the nominal exchange rate to 
absorb shocks from abroad – due to credibility deficits, a strong inflation pass-through 
of exchange rates and/or wide-spread currency substitution.  
How valid are these arguments and, consequently, how relevant does the OCA 
theory remain as a tool for assessing the costs of monetary integration? The 
endogeneity of the OCA criteria appears to be fairly well established by the recent 
empirical literature. Still, reliance on endogeneity should not be taken too far, when 
evaluating policy choices about monetary strategies and monetary integration, at least 
for two reasons.  
First, the endogeneity proposition may not hold in each and every case. In 
extremis, the effects may even go into the opposite direction. Krugman (1993) develops 
a theoretical model, which shows that more trade due to the use of a common currency 
could result in countries becoming more specialized in the goods in which they have a 
comparative advantage. As a result, the sensitivity of countries to industry-specific 
shocks could increase and business cycles could become less synchronized. A second 
and probably more important caveat is that it may take a long time for the endogeneity 
to work its way through the economic system. The experience of the euro area since 
1999 is a case in point. Gaspar and Mongelli (2001) conclude that "looking at the matrix 
of intra-euro area trade, such integration effects have not (yet?) become apparent". 
Thus, the transition period to the new equilibrium, in which the potential for external 
shocks would become much smaller, may well be fairly lengthy. During the 
intermediate period, the exposure continues to persist (or goes down only very 
gradually) and adjustment mechanisms remain particularly important. At the same time, 
it is notoriously difficult to increase an economy's adjustment capabilities quickly and, 
thus, to reduce the exposure to shocks in the transition period to the new steady state.  
The second argument against the traditional OCA theory, relying on risk-
sharing considerations, presupposes a complete portfolio diversification in order to be 
effective. While a common currency removes one obstacle to diversification, there are 
other factors that make for a home bias. Market segmentation tends to be nurtured by 
national borders, and the full harmonization of regulations on financial services is an 
arduous process, as the EU experience shows. Differences in tax laws, difficulties in 
assessing credit risks adequately (partly due to divergent insolvency laws) and the not-
yet-completed consolidation of financial infrastructure (in particular settlement systems) 
constitute further barriers to full integration in the euro area.  
A recent ECB study shows that diversification in the euro area has increased 
only slowly and in a limited manner since 1999 (see European Central Bank, 2001) 7. 
While accession countries have made major strides in aligning their regulations of 
financial services and capital movements to EU standards, full integration and thus a 
substantial degree of diversification will only be reached in the medium to longer term 
(partly also due to transition periods for some accession countries, for example, via 
                                                
7
 An alternative explanation for home bias is put forward by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) who 
argue that equity portfolio with home biases result from trading costs of goods from which these 
securities derive.  
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limitations for domestic pension funds to invest abroad). Risk-sharing arguments, 
therefore, do not alter the cost-benefit equation substantially at this stage or in the near 
future.  
The debate on the merits and costs of retaining or removing the monetary and 
exchange rate policy instruments has led to a perception that in small open economies 
monetary and exchange rate policies cannot be effectively used to smooth cyclical 
fluctuations. On the other hand, there are benefits of retaining the exchange rate as a 
policy instrument to correct major exchange rate misalignments in cases when 
adjustment through wages and prices would be much more costly due to the presence of 
rigidities. In other words, there are advantages of an escape option in a period of 
substantial distress 8. In this line of reasoning, removing the exchange rate instrument 
irrevocably therefore presupposes that any major risks and sources of potential 
exchange rate misalignments are sufficiently contained. The effectiveness of using the 
exchange rate instrument in exceptional circumstances to facilitate adjustment hinges to 
a large extent on the consistency and soundness of the overall policy mix a country has 
pursued. 
Backé and Wójcik (2002) argue that advanced accession countries have 
established a solid track record in terms of stabilization and reform that may facilitate 
the effective use of the exchange rate if a major asymmetric real shock hits. Moreover, 
misalignment risks in accession countries should not be underrated. The completion of 
price liberalization and adjustments of regulated prices, but also the upward adjustment 
of agricultural prices due to the prospective integration into the EU's common 
agricultural policy, may lead to price-wage spirals. Furthermore, demand side effects 
associated with the catching-up process may affect the competitive position of a 
country, in particular if they lead to additional wage pressure in the tradables sector or if 
investment shifts to the non-tradables sector (see Wójcik, 2001).  
This leaves the flipside of the argument, namely that the exchange rate can be a 
source of shocks. How relevant this issue is for the accession countries, will be 
examined below in the discussion of the benefits of monetary integration. The overall 
conclusion on this issue is that the optimum currency area theory still has some validity 
to assess costs and thus a fair weight has to be given to OCA-related considerations and 
conclusions in drawing an overall cost-benefit equation.  
What is the empirical picture in the accession countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe with respect to the OCA criteria? First, as regards the susceptibility of 
accession countries to asymmetric shocks, several, though not all, accession countries 
have already achieved a considerable degree of business cycle synchronization, at least 
in the area of industrial production (see e.g. Fidrmuc and Schardax, 2000). However, if 
one goes a step further and assesses the likelihood of asymmetric shocks by examining 
the correlation of supply and demand shocks between countries of the euro area and the 
Central and Eastern European accession countries, a less encouraging picture emerges 
                                                
8
 This is also acknowledged by OCA critics such as Buiter (2000) who argues that, in an 
overvaluation situation, "generating [the needed] differential rates of inflation [between the 
domestic economy and abroad] is likely to involve greater resource costs than achieving the 
same relative price or cost realignment through a change in the nominal exchange rate".  
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(see Horvath, 2001b, Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2001). The latter study, for example, in 
which shocks are recovered from estimated structural VAR models of output growth 
and inflation, finds that only Hungary, Estonia and, to a somewhat lesser extent Poland, 
display positive correlations of demand and supply shocks with the euro area in the 
period 1992-1995 to 2000-2001.  
Horvath (2001b) examines the correlation of supply and demand shocks of 
Central European and Baltic accession countries with four large EU economies for 
1993-1995 to 2000 and arrives at somewhat different but not very robust results, with 
Hungary and Slovenia displaying the relatively highest correlations for both types of 
shocks. Thus, the picture is diverse: some accession countries – Hungary, perhaps also 
Estonia, Slovenia and Poland – show positive correlations, the others do not. 
Furthermore, caution is warranted when drawing conclusions from these results, in 
particular if one considers that the correlations for some euro area countries like Greece 
and Ireland are not encouraging either.  
As for the other side of the OCA coin, i.e. the functioning of adjustment 
mechanisms, the operation of product and labor markets displays considerable variation 
among candidate countries, and this is particularly true for the wage formation process 
and wage flexibility. No comprehensive empirical study appears to exist, which would 
undertake an in-depth assessment of the functioning of product and labor markets in all 
ten accession countries 9. In very general terms, it seems to emerge from the limited 
body of analytical literature available that product markets in accession countries tend to 
function somewhat less efficiently than those of EU countries, while the accession 
countries' labor markets tend to be more flexible than those of the member states of the 
European Union (see IMF, 2000).  
Whether migration is an effective channel in accession countries for adjusting to 
idiosyncratic shocks is rather doubtful (see Fidrmuc, 2002). The same is true for the 
question of whether fiscal transfers can play a major role in easing asymmetric shocks. 
It should be noted, however, that these channels do not play a major role within the 
current euro area either. Finally, capital flows may also facilitate adjustment in the short 
run, but capital mobility cannot solve the adjustment problem in the long term, for 
example, if there are persistent external imbalances, as there are limits to negative net 
wealth positions of countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world (see Corden, 1973).  
In sum, one can differentiate among accession countries, which have made 
substantial advances towards "meeting" the OCA criteria – and, in a few cases, progress 
appears to be about similar to that of some Southern and non-continental EU member 
states – while others have moved ahead less. Thus, based on the OCA theory, a diverse 
picture emerges, with considerable risks for a number of accession countries.  
However, this is only a static snapshot. In a dynamic perspective, the 
correlation of shocks will probably increase with a further deepening of trade and 
                                                
9
 Nicoletti et al. (2000) has a useful analysis of product and labor market issues for the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. Two recent publications, which cover part of the ground for a 
larger set or all accession countries respectively, are Riboud et al. (2001) and the Transition 
Report 2000 (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2000), the latter containing 
a concise overview chapter on labor market issues.  
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financial integration in the run-up to membership in the European Union and beyond. 
The inclusion into the EU internal market will lower real trade costs and thereby foster 
trade. Financial integration will be nurtured by improved confidence and reduced 
uncertainty associated with EU accession. By a similar token, further reforms of product 
and labor markets, again in the EU membership context, will tend to increase the 
adjustment capabilities of accession countries. On the other hand, EU accession itself 
may constitute an asymmetric real shock for some candidates, giving rise to adjustment 
processes as a consequence of the full integration into the EU internal market during the 
early stages of membership in the European Union.  
The Benefit Side  
Moving to the benefit side of monetary integration, there are three major 
advantages. First, participation in monetary union eliminates the risk of exchange rate 
crises. This is particularly relevant for cases of sudden shifts in sentiment leading to 
abrupt stops or reversals in capital flows and thereby to currency crises. Second, 
monetary integration generates trade and growth gains, which are driven by lower 
transaction costs and reduced uncertainty. Third, a perspective of joining a monetary 
union can have positive credibility effects.  
When putting the first benefit, the elimination of the risk of currency crises, 
into perspective, two points emerge. First, assessing the risk of future exchange rate 
crises is notoriously difficult if not impossible. What is a widely shared view is that the 
risks of excessive capital inflows and sudden capital flow reversals can be mitigated by 
sound macroeconomic policies, by avoiding "soft" exchange rate pegs, by measures that 
strengthen financial institutions' risk-management capabilities and by supervisory 
activities concerning the financial sector and the foreign borrowing of the corporate 
sector. However, despite such measures, significant risks of nominal exchange rate 
shocks that are unrelated to any change in fundamentals may remain. 
There are different ways to cope with this risk. One is monetary and exchange 
rate policy cooperation within the European Union upon accession. More specifically, 
ERM II can, in principle, contain such risks, if it is operated in a way, which provides 
reasonable shelter against speculative attacks that are not related to changes in 
fundamentals, i.e. if the mechanism puts off "unjustified" capital flow reversals for 
those economies which are basically healthy in terms of their fundamentals. It could 
also be considered to complement existing arrangements by establishing an additional 
financial facility with automatic access for non-euro area member states of the European 
Union that have a straight record within intra-EU economic policy coordination and 
surveillance.  
Second, joining a monetary union per se does not contain the risk of financial 
crises other than exchange rate crises. On the one hand, this underlines how essential 
financial sector soundness and supervision are. On the other hand, it points at the crucial 
importance of achieving a high degree of nominal convergence, as embodied in the 
Maastricht convergence criteria, before adopting a common currency. If progress with 
nominal convergence were not sufficiently advanced, boom-bust cycles could develop 
(see Backé and Wójcik, 2002). Such cycles are often associated with banking crises 
emerging in the bust phase and also with a less dynamic GDP-per capita convergence 
over the full cycle.  
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The second main benefit of monetary union relates to trade and growth gains. 
Until recently, these effects were thought to be relatively modest, based on a string of 
empirical research applying time series methods. During the last two years, a new strand 
of papers relying on panel date methods has questioned this view. The debate was 
kicked off by Rose (2000) who found that the trade effects of using a common currency 
are statistically significant and huge: countries with a common currency are found to 
trade over three times as much an countries using different currencies. Moreover, Rose 
concludes that the impact of a common currency is an order of magnitude larger than 
the effect of reducing moderate exchange rate volatility to zero but retaining separate 
currencies. Frankel and Rose (2000) also find that potential benefits from the use of a 
common currency on trade are large and, moreover, that this additional trade has 
substantial positive effects on growth.  
Subsequent studies by Rose and Van Wincoop (2001), Melitz (2001) and 
Persson (2001) look further into the impact of using a common currency on trade and 
arrive at considerably lower, but still large positive, effects, with trade expanding, 
according to most estimates, by 40% to 50%.  
All this suggests that participation in a monetary union holds potential trade and 
growth gains, although there is limited knowledge on the issue to what extent these 
effects vary among countries participating in a monetary union. And what is unknown is 
the time profile, i.e. how quickly these effects will materialize, as discussed above for 
the case of the euro area.  
The third benefit of joining the euro area pertains to credibility effects. The 
argument is that joining a monetary union solves credibility problems of monetary 
authorities that stem from the dynamic inconsistency problem and thus eliminates a 
potential inflationary bias 10. These credibility gains – together with the reduction of the 
interest risk premium, due to the elimination of exchange rate risk, and with deepening 
financial market integration – lead to a reduction of real interest rates that in turn 
stimulates investments and spurs growth.  
Evidently, the significance and the size of these effects depend on the degree of 
credibility a country's policies enjoy in the first place, i.e. before it engages in a 
monetary unification process. In this context, two aspects that relate to the accession 
countries deserve particular attention. First, most accession countries have made 
substantial headway towards achieving macroeconomic stability. As a result, the 
credibility of the monetary authorities and the confidence in the national currencies has 
been on the rise, whereas inflation has been on a firm falling path. It is obvious that the 
prospects of EU integration have played and will continue to play a fundamental role in 
this respect.  
The external constraints that result from fulfilling the conditions for EU 
accession are helping to solve the commitment problem of monetary and fiscal 
authorities and constitute an anchor for macroeconomic discipline, but institution-
building/reinforcement and structural reforms have also similar effects. In particular, 
                                                
10
 Clearly, this is only true if the respective country joins a monetary union like the euro area, 
which does not itself suffer from a dynamic inconsistency problem.  
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preparing for EU accession has fostered the creation of domestic institutions dedicated 
to price stability, as legal provisions on the central bank independence have been 
strengthened substantially. Cukierman et al. (2001) as well as Dvorsky (2000) show that 
the legal independence of central banks in accession countries is well developed.  
Actual membership in the European Union and, in particular, participation in 
economic policy coordination and surveillance will further enhance the credibility of 
accession countries macroeconomic policies and, in general, eliminate any significant 
inflation bias of monetary policy. A coherent and thoroughly implemented strategy of 
joining the euro area and, subsequently, participation in the monetary union will further 
add to this, mostly by consolidating the credibility gains reaped at the earlier stages.  
The implications of this discussion of credibility issues for the speed of 
monetary integration are not straightforward. In essence, credibility is largely 
endogenous to the soundness and consistency of the overall economic policy-mix over 
time. Whether the pace of monetary integration has an impact on the quality of the 
policy mix, is a question that can hardly be answered ex ante. There may be cases where 
a speeding up of monetary integration (e.g. setting an ambitious target date) will 
reinforce a virtuous circle of improving economic fundamentals and credibility. 
Conversely, if the policies pursued are perceived to be or become inconsistent with the 
pace of monetary integration intended by the authorities, credibility will most probably 
suffer. All this suggests that credibility effects of the EU and subsequent euro area 
accession are important; however, it is uncertain whether the pace of monetary 
integration does affect the build-up of credibility and thus the time profile along which 
the related benefits can be reaped.  
Conclusions  
Three conclusions emerge from the preceding analysis:  
First, the available evidence of the economic costs and benefits of a future 
participation in the euro area is not uniform for all accession countries. This implies 
that, on economic grounds, the appropriate speed towards euro area accession may well 
be different between individual accession countries. In general terms, the costs of full 
monetary integration tends to decrease over time, as structural convergence – driven by 
the completion of transition and the accession to the European Union – proceeds.  
Second, from today's perspective, there is a considerable degree of uncertainty 
about the optimal date for joining the euro area. Results depend on what weights one 
assigns to individual effects, what probabilities one attaches to future events and with 
what interest rate one discounts future costs and gains, if they materialize at different 
points in time. Thus, based on economic reasoning, it is not possible, in most cases, to 
pinpoint a particular optimal target year for euro area accession for individual candidate 
countries, but most probably there will be a range of several years with similar cost-
benefit balances.  
Third, joining a monetary union is also a political economy issue. As the 
economics of accession is not sufficiently clear-cut, the decision about the date will, at 
the end of the day, hinge upon political considerations as well. This, in turn, may tip 
the balance in favor of a relatively speedy quest for euro area participation for a number 
of accession countries.  
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